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Abstract
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which pollution arises, in
an accumulatively way, from production. Householders do not care directly
about the environment, but pollution leads them to incur health costs when
they are elderly. We show that the presence of pollution means that the
economy more likely to be dynamically ineﬃcient. For these cases we analyze
two kinds of tax scheme: one based on production taxes and the other based
on capital and wage taxes. We show how to design both schemes in order to
put the economy into the golden rule allocation. We also show that under
the production tax scheme young and elderly agents pay less taxes (or receive
more transfers) than under the production tax system.
Key Words: dynamic ineﬃciency, externalities, health costs, overlapping
generations, pollution, taxes.
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21 Introduction
The World Bank (1992, p. 44) considers that the environment aﬀects the
economy through amenity, productivity and health channels. Most of the
economic literature that has addressed this issue considers only the ﬁrst
two channels. The amenity eﬀect is incorporated into economic models
by assuming that utility agents depend negatively on pollution, which is
a side product of the production process (e.g. Balçao (2001) and Nakadu
(2004)). The productivity channel considers that pollution may directly
aﬀect production technology (e.g. Grimaud (1999) and Chao and Peck
(2000)) or the productivity of any input (Gradus and Smulders (1996) and
Ono (2002)). The aim of this paper is to analyze the eﬀects that pollution
can produce on the economy when it aﬀects the health of agents who are
forced to spend on medical care when they are elderly.
The health eﬀect has not often been considered in theoretical environmen-
tal models. However, it is well established from the empirical point of view
that quality environment and health are positively related1 and that more
protective environmental policies may generate considerable health beneﬁts
in quantitative terms.2 Several epidemiologic analyses have focused on the
relationship between ambient air quality and morbidity among the elderly.
For instance, Schwartz (1995) shows ozone and PM10 to be associated with
increased risk of hospital admissions for pneumonia and Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease for persons over age 65. Xu et al. (1998), using epidemi-
ological studies carried out in Beijing, observe that long-term exposure to air
pollution is associated with increased respiratory symptoms or bronchitis in
adults. Also Pope et al. (1999) and Gold et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the elderly
are aﬀected by PM through the nervous system. Evans and Smith (2005)
point out that air pollution can be interpreted as a signal of the increased
1For instance, Boyce et al. (1999) ﬁnd that environmental stress is associated with
lower scores on a composite public health index, in a cross-sectional analysis of the 50 US
states. Also Gangadharan and Valenzuela (2001) show, using 1998 data from 51 countries,
show that environmental stress has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on health status when the
environmental variable is considered endogenous in the estimation procedure.
2Alberini et al. (1997) estimate that the morbidity value associated with the reduction
of the Pollution Standard Index in Taiwan is between $109 and $262 million. Quah
and Boon (2003) estimate that the total economic cost of PM10 in Singapore is about
4.31% of the country’s GDP in 1999. Ostro and Chestnut (1998) show that the annual
health beneﬁt for the USA of attaining the new standards for PM2.5 relative to 1994-1996
ambient concentration is estimated at $32 billion. In similar research, Zaim (1999) ﬁnds
that a decrease in PM10 and sulphur dioxide levels to the World Health Organization
guideline in the Turkish economy would have resulted in a saving of 0.12% and 0.08% of
Turkey’s 1990 and 1993 GDP’s, respectively.
3risk of mortality associated with exposure to ﬁne particles for older adults.
From a theoretical point of view, the health eﬀect has been analyzed
by Williams (2002, 2003) in a static general equilibrium models. In his
models pollution deteriorates health (reducing the time available for leisure)
or reduces consumers’ productivity (which forces expenditure on medical
care). He ﬁn d st h a tt h em o r ep o l l u t i o na ﬀects consumers’ health, the lower
the beneﬁts associated with pollution abatement are. We also consider
that pollution deteriorates consumers’ health, forcing consumers to spend on
medical care. We depart from the analysis of Williams (2002, 2003) analysis
by considering a dynamic general equilibrium model in which pollution is
a stock that accumulates over time with the emissions produced by ﬁrms.
This is relevant since most pollutants remain in the atmosphere for long
periods (for instance the greenhouse gases causing global warming, aldicarb
aﬀecting groundwater, pollutants causing acid rain, etc.). Therefore, our
model includes a dynamic structure showing a production-environmental
quality trade-oﬀ that implies that whenever the production economy grows,
the stock of pollution increases.
Dynamic general equilibrium models have been considered in the relevant
literature to examine environmental issues. However, most of the relevant
studies assume dynamic models in which agents live for many periods
(possibly for ever) and, therefore, restrict their analyses to intragenerational
problems. Following this approach all future impacts are treated as if they
happened to current agents, ignoring the fact that society is composed of
mortal individuals of diﬀerent generations whose actions have consequences
that outlive them. Authors such as Solow (1986) and Padilla (2002) suggest
that it is useful to capture these intergenerational aspects in the economic
analysis of the environment and natural resources. Moreover, there is strong
empirical evidence against the idea that members of extended families are
altruistically linked in the way postulated by standard inﬁnitely lived agents
models (see Altonji et al. (1992)).
Recent articles have addressed intergenerational environmental issues
using overlapping generation models (OGM).3 However, a recent article by
3John and Pecchenino (1994) analyze the potential conﬂict between economic growth
and the maintenance of environmental quality in a context where consumption degrades
the environment. Using the same model John et al. (1995) and Ono (1996, 2002) examine
the optimal tax policies that must be implemented by a long-lived government which lasts
longer than a typical agent of the economy, in order to internalize the intergenerational
externalities produced by competitive behavior. Guruswamy et al. (1997) analyze the
relationship between resource depletion and pollution. Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998)
study the eﬀects of environmental taxation within an OGM in which the quality of the
environment is considered as a durable consumption good. Howarth and Norgaard (1992)
and Howarth (1998) analyze climate change in an OGM framework. Jouvet et al. (2000)
4Pautrel (2007) is the only one that considers an a dynamic general equilibrium
model with an overlapping framework where the health channel is the link
between the environmental pollution and the economy. In particular, he
assumes that a better health status makes workers more productive. In this
context, Pautrel shows that active environmental policies are more likely to
promote long-run growth when health is very sensitive to pollution.
Our paper is closely related to this literature. We also focus on
intergenerational environmental issues and use an OGM to examine the
eﬀects that pollution can produce on the economy. However we diﬀer from
Pautrel (2007) in two essential aspects. First, we consider that pollution
aﬀects the health of agents, who are forced to expend on medical care when
they are elderly, rather than aﬀecting the productivity of workers4. Second,
we do not analyze long-run growth eﬀects. We focus rather on optimal
taxation and show how to design tax schemes in order to put the economy
into eﬃcient allocations.
Our main ﬁnding is that the presence of pollution makes it more likely
that competitive equilibrium will be dynamically ineﬃcient. In particular,
we show that if the economy accumulates capital above what we deﬁne as
the super golden rule ratio, there are other allocations where no generation is
worse oﬀ and some are better oﬀ. For those cases, we analyze two kinds of tax
schemes. One scheme is based on taxes on production and the other on taxes
on capital and wages. We show that if both schemes are designed to place the
economy in the golden rule allocation, then young and elderly agents pay less
taxes (or receive more transfers) under the production scheme than under the
capital-wage tax system. Since the article focuses on the long-term health
cost that each generation can expect to pay over its ﬁnite lifetime, some
numerical examples of the optimal taxes schemes are simulated, with the
economy being calibrated assuming that each generation lasts for 30 years.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. The stationary competitive equilibrium is characterized in Section 3.
Section 4 focuses on optimal allocations. In Section 5 optimal tax scheme
designs are presented and some numerical examples are simulated. Section
6 concludes.
construct an OGM model that includes a pollution externality in which individuals are
altruistically linked to their oﬀspring. Ono and Maeda (2001, 2002) analyze the eﬀects of
population aging on economic growth and the environment.
4This simpliﬁcation of the relationship between pollution and health allows us to keep
the analysis within tractable terms. This approach can be considered reasonable given
that we are interested in obtaining qualitative results focused on the inherent ineﬃciencies
arising from pollution.
52T h e m o d e l
Consider a two-period OGM with production. A new generation of Nt agents
is born at each period t =1 ,2,...The population grows at a constant rate,
n, i.e. Nt = Nt−1(1 + n). The preferences of an agent born in period t are
represented by the following utility function u(c1,t)+ 1
1+θu(c2,t+1), where c1,t
and c2,t+1, represent consumption in young and old age, respectively and θ is
the subjective discount rate of the agent. We assume that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when she is young and
supplies it to ﬁrms inelastically. The agent receives a wage, wt, which is
used for consumption in the ﬁrst period, c1,t,a n df o rs a v i n g ,st.S i n c e n o
income is earned in old age, all agents are savers, i.e. st > 0. This saving is
inelastically supplied to ﬁrms which pay (1 + rt+1)st to the agent when she
is old. The agent divides her saving in old age between consumption, c2,t+1,
and pollution costs.
We assume that the pollution costs faced by the older generation depend
on the current level of the stock of pollution. Formally, we deﬁne H(Et)
as the total amount paid by elderly agents living in period t as pollution
costs, where Et is the stock of pollution.5 For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that Ht = ξEt, therefore the pollution costs paid by an elderly agent
born at period t − 1 can be expressed as (1 + n)ξet, where et = Et/Nt.
This formalization implies the pollution costs paid by each elderly agent
depends upon the stock of pollution and the number of elderly agents. One
possible interpretation of this assumption is that pollution results in illness
that requires new medical research, treatments and hospital equipment; this
may imply that pollution costs in each period act as a ﬁxed cost for society.6
From now on we refer to these pollution costs as health costs.
Firms behave perfectly competitively and maximize proﬁts. They use
capital, K, and labor, N, as inputs with a standard production function
F(Kt,N t) that exhibits constant returns to scale. This implies that
production can be expressed in per worker terms as f(kt),w h e r ekt = Kt/Nt.
We assume that f0 > 0 and f00 < 0. Capital stock depreciates at a constant
rate 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
5In a static general equilibrium model, Williams (2002) considers that pollution may
aﬀect the health of the population either by causing the representative agent to spend time
sick (reducing the time available for labor) or by forcing expenditure on medical care. We
following this second approach.
6One could assume that most of the health damage from air pollution comes in the
form of premature mortality. We do not consider this possibility here; in fact, we could
take the pollution costs paid by elderly agents as being enough to guarantee that agents
live two periods.
6The stock of pollution in the current period, Et, is determined by a
proportion of the past pollutant stock, Et−1, plus the new emissions which are
proportional to current production7. Therefore, the dynamics of the stock of
pollution can be expressed as
Et =( 1− δ)Et−1 + αF (Kt,N t), (1)
where the parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 denotes the rate of decay. This parameter
can be interpreted as the rate of natural puriﬁcation of pollutants from the
environment per period. Note that δ =1means that pollution is not an
accumulative process. In this case the health costs of an elderly agent depend
exclusively on production in that period. Parameter α>0 represents the
cleanness of the technology used to produce; the lower α is the cleaner the
technology is8.
Notice that the only way to abate pollution by a choice is by reducing
capital since labor is inelastically supplied and the population increases at an
exogenous constant rate. Therefore, agents can reduce pollution by selecting
consumption levels which implies reducing savings and capital accumulation.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
In the model described above, a dynamic competitive equilibrium is a
sequence of {kt,c 1,t,c 2,t,w t,r t,s t,et}∞
t=0 such that, for any given k0 and
e0,a g e n t sm a x i m i z eu t i l i t y ,ﬁrms maximize proﬁts and markets clear.
The representative agent born in period t maximizes her utility function
with respect to young and old consumption, taking wages, interest rates and









c1,t + st = wt,
c2,t+1 +( 1+n)ξet+1 =( 1+rt+1)st. (3)
Notice that the health costs are modeled as withdrawals from savings, which
implies a reduction in consumption in old age.





7The results of the model do not change qualitatively if current production directly
aﬀects the future stock of pollution instead of the current one.
8This equation diﬀers from John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995) who
consider a model where consumption (rather than production) degrades the environment.
7This equation states that the representative agent chooses consumption
such that the marginal rate of substitution between current and future
consumption is equal to the marginal rate of transformation. This optimal
condition and the restrictions, (3), implicitly deﬁne saving as a function
of wages, interest rates and pollution; it also depends upon the subjective
discount rate parameter, θ, and the marginal private costs of pollution, ξ,
st = s(wt,r t+1,e t+1 | θ,ξ).

































(1 + rt+1)(1+n)et+1u00 (c2,t+1)
∆
> 0.
where ∆ =( 1+θ)u00 (c1,t)+( 1+rt+1)
2 u00 (c2,t+1) < 0.
We obtain the standard OGM results for wages and interest rates. If
wages increase, the agent saves part of the increase for future purchases. On
the other hand, an increase in interest rates may increase or decrease saving
depending on the extent of the substitution, income and wealth eﬀects. If
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is high enough
then sr > 0. In the particular case of a utility function with a constant
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which is positive (negative) whenever the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, 1/ , is larger (lower) than 1+( 1+n)
ξet+1
c2,t+1.9
9This result can be generalized to any utility function with the regular properties. In
8We also obtain that an increase in the next period stock of pollution
implies that agents save more because they will face higher health costs
when elderly. With respect to the parameters aﬀecting the saving function,
we obtain the expected results. The more patient the agent is (i.e. the lower
θ is) and the larger her marginal private cost of pollution is, the larger savings
are.
Firms maximize proﬁts and hire labor and capital until their marginal
products equal their factor prices. Given the constant return to scale
production function assumed, these conditions can be expressed as
wt = f (kt) − f
0 (kt)kt, (5)
rt = f
0 (kt) − λ. (6)
The market clears when total investment equals total savings. In per worker
terms, this means
(1 + n)kt+1 = s(wt,r t+1,e t+1).
Substituting equations (5) and (6 ) into this last equation, we obtain
(1 + n)kt+1 = s[f (kt) − f
0 (kt)kt,f
0 (kt+1) − λ,et+1], (7)
which is a nonlinear dynamic equation relating the two state variables of the
model, k and e. The other relationship between the state variables is given by





et + αf (kt+1). (8)
Equations (7) and (8) form a system of ﬁrst-order nonlinear diﬀerence
equations in k and e. The solution of this system characterizes the competitive
equilibrium paths for capital and pollution, {kt,e t}∞
t=1, given the initial
values of the state variables, k0 and e0
10. Once those paths are known
{c1,t,c 2,t,s t,w t,r t}∞
t=1 can be obtained using (3)-(6).
the standard OGM without health costs, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/ ,
larger than one is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for sr > 0. However, in this version
of the model, the threshold for guaranteeing a positive sr is greater than one.
10Since capital is essential for production, k0 must be positive. If k0 =0the young
agents in the initial generation would have no income and consumption would remain zero
forever. However e0 may be zero.
93.1 The Steady State
A steady state equilibrium is an allocation where capital and pollution per
worker ratios are stationary11, i.e. k and e are such that





















The following proposition characterizes the comparative static behavior of
the steady state of this model.












the steady state associated with the dynamic system, (7)-(8), is a sink. Under
this condition changes in the parameters of the model aﬀect the steady state
value of k and e as follows:
∂k/∂θ < 0,∂ k/∂n < 0,∂ k/∂δ < 0,∂ k/∂α > 0,∂ k/∂ξ > 0,
∂e/∂θ < 0,∂ e/∂n < 0,∂ e/∂δ < 0,∂ e/∂α > 0,∂ e/∂ξ > 0.
Furthermore, if the saving function is an increasing (decreasing) function of
the interest rate, then, ∂k/∂λ < 0( > 0), and ∂e/∂λ < 0( > 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that in our set up we have two initial conditions; the characteristics of
our problem lead us to assume that the initial stocks of capital and pollution,
k0 and e0, are known. Therefore, we are interested in having a sink steady
state in such a way that whatever the initial conditions are, the steady state
can be reached. If the steady state were a saddle-path12,o n l yo n eo ft h et w o
state variables could be predetermined at the initial period: the other has to
be determined to be sure that the solution is along the unique saddle path.
We can see that the results of the standard Diamond’s model (1965)
still hold when we have a pollution externality such as the one presented
in this model. On the one hand, we observe that economies with high
population growth rates have lower levels, in per worker terms, of capital
11Stationary paths are called golden aged paths by some authors (Diamond (1965),
Phelps(1965)). We focus on stationary paths because this allows for direct comparison
between our results and others based on OGM (for instance John et al. (1995) or Ono
(1996)).


















> 0, then the steady state associated with the dynamic system, (7)-(8), is a
saddle path instead of a sink.
10and pollution. The intuition is clear, if the population grows faster, a greater
part of output has to be destined for consumption, and therefore less for
investment in future capital and pollution (in per worker terms). This result
on pollution seems counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance. Notice however that the
stock of pollution, Et = etNt, in the steady state always grows at the same
rate as the population, n. This means that higher population growth rates
imply that the total stock of pollution grows faster. On the other hand,
when saving is an increasing function of the interest rate13, economies with
a high capital depreciation rate accumulate less capital and pollution than
those with a low depreciation rate, because a higher capital depreciation
rate results in a lower interest rate, and therefore lower savings, capital and
pollution.
Relating to the parameters associated with the externality introduced
in the model, our characterization of the steady state shows that the more
severe the pollution problem is for the economy the higher the capital and
pollution ratios are. This can be observed through the parameters, δ,α and
ξ.
For instance, a lower rate of natural puriﬁcation of pollutants from the
atmosphere, δ,implies a higher future stock of pollution for any given stock of
capital, and therefore a higher health cost faced by elderly agents. This larger
future costs makes agents save more for old age, which implies that society
accumulates more capital and degrades the environment more. Likewise if
the technology used to produce becomes dirtier (i.e. α higher), new emissions
of pollutants are higher for any stock of pollution, and so are health costs.
This results in higher savings, capital and pollution. The intuition is the
same for the marginal private cost of pollution, ξ;ah i g h e rv a l u ef o rt h i s
parameter induces higher savings because it makes agents pay higher health
costs for any stock of pollutant. This leads capital and pollution stocks to
increase. It is worth mentioning that all these results depend crucially upon
the assumption that there is not any other alternative channel for reducing
pollution other than to accumulate less capital by reducing savings.14
These results diﬀer in some terms from those obtained by John et
al. (1995), who analyze an OGM in which consumption degrades the
environment and the government may improve environmental quality by
levying taxes on young generation. One of their results is that economies
13Savings depend positively on interest rate when the substitution eﬀect is greater than
t h es u mo ft h ei n c o m ea n dw e a l t he ﬀects. A high enough intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for consumption guarantees sr > 0 (See footnote 9).
14We may include the possibility of abatement by using part of the young wealth to invest
in improving the quality of the atmosphere. We belive that if this possibility is excluded
the results of the model are clearer and can be interpreted more straightforwardly.
11in which consumption causes greater environmental degradation accumulate
less capital. Our result goes in the opposite direction, showing that economies
in which production causes higher environmental degradation accumulate
more capital. This is so because in John et al.’s model agents pay taxes
to maintain environmental quality when they are young and therefore an
increase in degradation reduces their savings for the future; however, in our
model, higher environmental degradation increases health costs, which are
paid in the old age, so agents have to increase savings and therefore capital.
4E ﬃciency
It is well known that in the standard OGM without externalities the
competitive equilibrium is, in general, not Pareto optimal (Diamond (1965)).
The intuition for this result is clear. In an OGM intertemporal trades are
restricted because economic agents have a limited planning horizon and
it may be the case that their decisions are not eﬃcient. In this OGM
context, Phelps (1965) deﬁnes the golden rule capital ratio as the capital
ratio that maximizes consumption among all paths in which capital grows
at a constant rate (i.e. in which the capital ratio is constant). He proves
that any competitive growth economy whose stationary capital ratio exceeds
the golden rule level is dynamically ineﬃcient in the sense that there exists
another stationary allocation (with a lower capital ratio) where no generation
is worse oﬀ and at least some generations are better oﬀ. We expect the
introduction of any negative pollution externality in the OGM to extend the
scope of this feature.
We know that any allocation selected by an idealized central planner
capable of caring not only about the current generation but also about future
generations is optimal in the Pareto sense (see Blanchard and Fisher (1989)
pages 97-104). If the current period is t =0 , the central planner problem





















F (Kt,N t)=Ntc1,t + Nt−1c2,t + Kt+1 − (1 − λ)Kt + H (Et),
Et =( 1− δ)Et−1 + αF (Kt,N t),
15We are taking the standard approach in the literature, in which the central planner
discounts the future at a constant rate. See Karp (2005) for an approach where long-lived
environmental problems are analyzed under hyperbolic discounting i.e. assuming that the
ability to make distinctions diminishes for more distant events..
12where R ≥ 0 is the subjective discount rate of the planner. If the planner
cares less about future generations, R is strictly positive and if she cares
equally about all generations, R is zero16.T h e ﬁrst restriction of problem
(11) is the resource constraint of the economy in period t, which means that
the total supply of goods is allocated to the consumption of the young and old,
to health expenditures and to providing for the next period’s capital stock.
The second restriction indicates the dynamics of the stock of pollution.
The ﬁrst order condition of the planner’s maximization problem can be
summarized in the following equations,
(1 + θ)u





=[ ( 1 − αξ)f








0 (kt+2)+( 1− λ)],(13)
Equation (12) represents intergenerational optimal consumption allocations
and states that the marginal rate of substitution, from the point of view of
the central planner, between consumption by the young and consumption by
the elderly must be equal to the rate of transformation, (1 + n). Equation
(13) is the intragenerational optimal consumption condition and indicates
how consumption for each generation is chosen.
Evaluating these conditions and the restrictions of the problem in the





















αξ (1 + n)(1+R)
































where superscript E stands for eﬃcient.
16Note that if R is non-positive the sum of the utilities does not converge. However, we
consider the borderline case, R =0 , because it is possible in this case to discuss optimality
using the overtaking criterion (Burmeister, 1980), which essentially states that path A
overtakes path B if there exists a ﬁnite t∗ such that the present value of the future utilities
associated with path A up to time t∗ exceeds that associated with path B up to t∗,a n d
that inequality remains in the same direction for all t>t ∗. A path is optimal if it overtakes
all other paths.
13Condition (14) shows how the planner allocates consumption intergenera-
tionally. Notice that when all generations are treated equally by the planner
(i.e. R =0 ), this is the allocation that would arise if consumption decisions
were made individually based on an interest rate equal to the growth rate of
the population (compare (14) with (4)). The intuition is clear. In stationary
equilibria, a switch of one unit of consumption of an agent from her youth to
her old age is equivalent to removing one unit of consumption from each of
the young agents in the living generation and giving the total amount to the
contemporary older generation, of whom there are n percent fewer members.
Equation (15) indicates that the central planner recognizes that current pro-
duction degrades the future environment, aﬀecting future health costs faced
by agents; therefore, the discounted marginal net beneﬁto fa ne x t r au n i to f
capital (left-hand side) equates to its discounted marginal cost (right-hand
side)17. Equations (16) and (17) are the resource constraint of the economy
and the stock of pollution in the steady state, respectively.
It is interesting to characterize the eﬃc i e n ts o l u t i o nf o rt h ec a s eo faz e r o
social discount rate, i.e. R =0 , since this is the discount used in empirical
studies such as the Stern Report on Climate Change. From the theoretical
point of view, this solution is called the golden rule. Considering equation
(15), we can see that the optimal stationary capital ratio for the golden rule
case is given by, ∙
1 −








= n + λ,
where superscript G stands for golden rule allocation. Diamond (1965) shows
that in the standard OGM without pollution externalities any economy
whose stationary capital ratio exceeds the golden rule level is dynamically
ineﬃcient in the sense that there exists another stationary allocation where
no generation is worse oﬀ and at least some generations are better oﬀ.T h e
following example shows that, in general, this statement is not true when
there are pollution externalities.
Example 1 Consider an economy where each period covers 30 years with
the following annual parameter values18: n =0 .01,λ=0 .05,δ=0 .005,
17Notice that in order to have a positive k
E
it is necessary that 1−
(1+n)(1+R)
(1+n)(1+R)−(1−δ)αξ >
0. This feasibility condition establishes that, from the central planner’s point of view, the
discounted health costs associated with one unit of production should be less than that
unit; otherwise net output will be negative.
18It is easy to show that if each period covers 30 years, the parameter values for each
period are such that (1 + n∗)=( 1 + n)
p , (1 − λ
∗)=( 1 − λ)
p , (1 − δ
∗)=( 1 − δ)
p ,
α∗ = αδ
∗/δ and (1 + R∗)=( 1+R)
p where variables without ∗ are the annual parameter
values and p =3 0 .
14Figure 1: Eﬃcient capital and planner’s discount rate
α =1 ,ξ=0 .01. The production function is f (kt)=k
β
t with β =0 .35.
Then, when the central planner’s annual discount rate is lower than 3%, the
eﬃcient stationary capital ratio is larger than that associated with the golden
rule.
T h er e s u l to ft h i se x a m p l ec a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e1w h e r et h ee ﬃcient
stationary capital ratio, kE, is plotted as a function of the subjective annual
discount rate of the planner, R. It is clear that the eﬃcient steady state
capital stock is not monotonically decreasing in the central planner’s discount
rate. In particular, when the central planner’s annual discount rate is lower
than 3%, the eﬃcient capital ratio is higher than that associated with the
golden rule. This can be generalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the pollution externality is such that αξ >
(n+δ)2
(1+n)2−(1−δ)(1−λ),
then there are always eﬃcient capital ratios that exceed the golden rule capital
ratio. Otherwise, the maximum eﬃcient capital ratio is given by the golden
rule allocation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The discount rate aﬀects the
steady state capital stock through two channels. The ﬁrst, classic, channel
15says that a lower planner’s discount rate implies higher weights attached to
the welfare of future generations, and thereby higher savings that transfer
higher capital stock to the future. The second channel is based on the
pollution externality and contrasts with the eﬀects of the ﬁrst channel. A
lower planner’s discount rate implies lower pollution levels transferred to
future periods, but since pollution is linked to the capital stock, it also implies
lower capital stock levels transferred as well. The relative strengths of the
two channels determines whether a decrease in the planner’s discount rate
implies higher or lower capital stock. In particular, we show that if the
pollution externality is weak (i.e. if αξ is small), or if the pollution decay
rate is large (δ close to one), then the classic conclusion holds that a decrease
in the planner’s discount rate implies an increase in the capital stock.19
It is well known that without the pollution externality all generations of
an economy whose stationary capital ratio exceeds the golden rule capital
ratio may be better oﬀ if the stock of capital is reduced once and forever and
the consumption of current elderly agents increases by the same amount
(Blanchard and Fischer (1989), page 102-104). In general, this kind of
reallocation of capital over time only works in the presence of pollution
externalities for economies whose capital ratio is high enough. In particular,
we can ﬁnd a stationary capital ratio benchmark such that any economy
exceeding it is dynamically ineﬃcient for any δ.W ec a l lt h i sb e n c h m a r kt h e









where superscript SG stands for super golden rule allocation. It is easy to
show that kSG >k G for δ<1 and kSG = kG for δ =1 . The following
proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 2 Any economy with pollution externalities whose stationary
capital ratio exceeds the super golden rule capital ratio, kSG, is dynamically
ineﬃcient.
Proof. See Appendix.¥
The main reason why the Blanchard and Fischer reallocation of capital
does not work in our model is because pollution is an accumulative process.
Observe that we have two stock variables in our model (capital and pollution)
19Observe that when δ =1 , the condition for having eﬃcient capital ratios larger than
the golden rule capital ratio becomes αξ > 1, which is not possible because then k
E
becomes negative (see footnote 17).
16and this makes the model work in some peculiar ways. Suppose that we are
in a stationary equilibrium and at some period τ,the capital ratio is changed
once and for ever. Then the economy will not be in stationary equilibrium
from that period on. The economy will need a number of periods to make
the pollution stock stationary; and that the number will depend on the rate
of natural puriﬁcation of the pollutant from the environment, δ. Only when
δ =1 , i.e. when emissions stay in the environment for just one period, does a
change in the capital ratio of the once and for ever type makes the economy
move immediately from one stationary equilibrium to another. Because
of this, Diamond’s result (1965) still holds in the presence of a negative
production externality if pollution is not an accumulative process (δ =1 ) .
Notice that Proposition 2 also shows this case because the super golden rule
capital ratio coincides with the golden rule in the case of δ =1 .
Figure 2 summarizes these results. Proposition 2 shows that any economy
with a capital ratio greater than kSG is dynamically ineﬃcient. Let kMAX
denote the maximum eﬃcient capital ratio among all the solutions of the
central planner’s optimization problem, (11),20 then those economies whose
capital ratio is lower than kMAX are dynamically eﬃcient. Lemma 1 states
the conditions under which kMAX = kG. We are not able to classify economies
with capital ratios in
¡
kMAX,kSG¢
in terms of eﬃciency. On the one hand,
those economies could be dynamically eﬃcient because the solution set of
the central planner problem’s, (11), may not give us the whole set of optimal
allocations. Consider, for example, a planner with a subjective discount
rate, R, that changes over time in a hyperbolic shape (see Karp (2005)). The
optimization problem (11) does not take this possibility into account. On the
other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that those economies may be
dynamically ineﬃcient. The proof of Proposition 2 only shows that reducing
of current investment, increasing current consumption by the same amount
and keeping the future capital ratio constant over time dominates, in the
Pareto sense, any allocation where the capital ratio is higher than the super
golden rule level. However we cannot exclude the possibility that other kinds
of reallocation of capital over time may improve some generations without




We show in Proposition 2 that any economy with a capital ratio
20In the proof of Lemma 1, we show that kMAX is the capital ratio associated with the
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Figure 2: Ranges and capital ratios
greater than kSG is dynamically ineﬃcient. It is easy to see that kSG is
decreasing in the pollution parameters. Therefore economies with more
environmental problems have a larger range of dynamically ineﬃcient
allocations. On the other hand, we show in Proposition 1 that economies
with more environmental problems accumulate more capital and degrade the
environment more when they act in a competitive manner. These two results
allow us to formalize the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The higher the pollution externalities are, the higher the
competitive stationary capital ratio is and the lower the super golden rule
capital ratio is.
Proof. Pollution externalities are the result of three factors: a lower
rate of natural puriﬁcation of the pollutant from the atmosphere, δ, dirtier
production technology (i.e. a higher α) and/or a higher marginal private cost
of pollution, ξ.
It is easy to see the ∂kSG/∂δ =0 ,∂ k SG/∂α < 0 and ∂kSG/∂ξ < 0.
Moreover, in Proposition 1, we prove that ∂k/∂δ < 0,∂ k/∂α > 0 and




∂α > 0, and
∂(k−kSG)
∂ξ > 0. ¥
5 Tax Schemes
In a competitive equilibrium, no generation has any incentive to consider
the successive generations. Therefore, future generations suﬀer from past
18production which has degraded the environment. We have seen that a
competitive stationary equilibrium is dynamically ineﬃcient when the capital
ratio is higher than the super golden rule allocation and also that the
larger the pollution externality is the higher the likelihood of dynamic
ineﬃciency is. This section studies how to implement tax schemes in order
to achieve eﬃcient allocations for economies whose competitive equilibrium
is dynamically ineﬃcient. In particular, we ﬁnd the optimal tax schemes
that place stationary competitive economies in the golden rule allocation
which is the eﬃcient allocation associated with a central planner who does
not discount the future and treat all future generation equally.
5.1 Taxes on Production
We introduce a Pigouvian tax on production and a lump-sum tax system
into our model. Let τp be a production tax paid by ﬁrms per unit of
output produced and let τy and τo be lump-sum taxes levied on young and
elderly agents, respectively, in any period. The government budget constraint





+ τpf (k)=0 .
This means that at least one of the lump-sum taxes must be a transfer.





(1 − τp)f (kt) − wt − (rt + λ)kt,
for ko given.










c1,t + st = wt − τy,
c2,t+1 +( 1+n)ξet+1 =( 1+rt+1)st − τo.







































C − τo, (20)
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where equations (18), (19) and (20) are from the consumer’s maximization
problem, equations (21) and (22) correspond to the wage and interest rate
that maximize ﬁrms’ proﬁts, respectively, equation (23) comes from the
market clearance condition and equation (24) indicates the relationship
between the environment and the capital ratio in the steady state.
Comparing these equations with the optimal conditions deﬁned by the
golden rule allocation, we can set the optimal production tax scheme
that satisﬁes the government budget constraint. For instance, comparing
equations (18) and (12) valued at R =0 , we see that in this competitive
solution an optimal tax scheme implies rC = n. Taking this into account,






= n + λ.
If this expression is compared with the eﬃcient condition given by equation
(13) valued at R =0 , we see that the production tax has to be set to
τ∗
p = 1+n
n+δαξ. In other words, only if the tax production is set in this way can
the competitive equilibrium can meet the eﬃcient solution implied by the
golden rule.
The following proposition shows the complete characterization of this
optimal tax scheme,
Proposition 4 Economies whose stationary competitive equilibrium over-
accumulates capital can achieve the optimal golden rule allocation by the











































o < 0 and τ∗
y ≤ 0 (> 0) when the presence of pollution is (is not) the
only cause of capital overaccumulation.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Notice that with this optimal scheme elderly agents always receive
transfers. However young agents can be characterized both as tax payers and
transfer receivers. The existence of two possible market failures is the reason
for these two alternative situations. In those economies where the competitive
equilibrium is eﬃcient in the absence of pollution, the introduction of the
environmental problem generates an ineﬃc i e n c yw h i c hi sa m e n d e dw i t ha
tax scheme where both young and elderly agents share the revenue from
the tax on production. However, in those economies where the competitive
equilibrium is ineﬃcient in the absence of pollution, the introduction of
the environmental problem exacerbates this ineﬃciency. In this case, the
young agents are tax payers and transfer resources to elderly agents (who
also receive the revenue from the tax on production).21
The following example illustrates an economy that may be in either of
the two situations depending on the labor share parameter.
Example 2 Consider an economy where each period covers 30 years with
the following annual parameter values22: n =0 .02,λ=0 .04,δ=0 .005. The
utility function is logarithmic, u(ci,t)=l n ( ci,t), with an annual subjective
discount rate θ =0 .02. The production function is given by f (kt)=Ak
β
t
with A =2 0 .
i) If the labor share is such that β>0.2637 then dynamic ineﬃciency
only appears when pollution externalities are high enough. In this case
young and elderly agents are transfer receivers with the production tax
scheme.
ii) If the labor share is such that β<0.2637 then dynamic ineﬃciency
appears even in absence of pollution externalities. In this case elderly
agents are transfer receivers and young agents are tax payers under the
production tax scheme.
Table 1 shows the optimal taxes on production under the two situations
for the economy described in Example 2. On the one hand, we can see that
21Remember that the competitive equilibrium of an overlapping generation economy is
not always ineﬃcient. In a standard OGM, only those economies in which the stationary
competitive capital ratio exceeds the golden rule capital ratio are dynamically ineﬃcient.
22See footnote 18.
21Table 1: Optimal Taxes on Production (Example 2)
β =0 .25
No pollution (αξ =0 ) Pollution externalities (αξ =0 .003)
kC =4 .2224 τp =0 kC =8 .5563 τp =0 .1596
kG =3 .8722 τy =0 .4706 kG =3 .0711 τy =0 .3733
kSG =3 .8722 τo = −0.8525 kSG =3 .4458 τo = −8.3282
β =0 .35
No pollution (αξ =0 ) Pollution externalities (αξ =0 .003)
kC =4 .2285 τp =0 kC =7 .2200 τp =0 .1596
kG =8 .0024 τy =0 kG =6 .1246 τy = −3.7654
kSG =8 .0024 τo =0 kSG =6 .9946 τo = −4.0796
if the labor share is high, the competitive equilibrium is eﬃcient provided
there are no pollution externalities
¡
kC <k G¢
. Observe that in this situation
it is not necessary to implement any tax scheme (see the left lower corner
case). However, when pollution aﬀects the economy, dynamic ineﬃciency
may appear when the externalities are high enough.23 In this case, the
optimal production tax scheme consists of taxing ﬁrms and sharing out
the revenue between elderly and young agents (see the right lower corner
case). On the other hand, if the labor share is low, the market economy




. This ineﬃciency disappears with an adequate
transfer from young people to elderly agents without taxing ﬁrms (see top
left corner case). If the economy also suﬀers pollution, the overaccumulation
of capital is even larger. In this state, the optimal production tax implies
taxing ﬁrms; this revenue goes to increase the transfer received by elderly
agents and to lower the taxes paid by young agents, although they are still
net tax payers (see top right corner).
5.2 Taxes on Capital and Wages
Following John et al. (1995), we consider an alternative tax scheme based
on taxing capital and wage incomes. In particular, we focus on two diﬀerent
23In this example, if the pollution externality is such that αξ < 0.0025, the market
equilibrium is eﬃcient because kC <k G.
22possibilities. Firsts, we assume that the planner levies taxes on capital and
w a g ei n c o m e sa td i ﬀerent rates and second, that they are taxed at the same
rate.
Assume that the planner levies taxes on gross capital and wages at the
rates τk and τw,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,a n dl e tσ be a transfer that elderly agents
receive, in any period. The government budget constraint implies that the
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c1,t + st = wt(1 − τw),
c2,t+1 +( 1+n)ξet+1 =( 1+rt+1)(1− τk)st + σ.






































































The following proposition summarizes the features of this optimal tax scheme.
Proposition 5 Dynamically ineﬃcient economies can achieve the golden
























23where σ∗ > 0, 0 ≤ τ∗
k < 1 and τ∗
w < 1. Moreover τ∗
w > 0 provided the
economy overaccumulates capital even without the presence of pollution.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
With this tax scheme, both young and old agents can be tax payers or
transfer receivers. It is easy to show that net taxes paid by each type of
agent can be expressed as

















To ≡ (1 + r)sτk − σ = −(1 + n)Ty,
where Ty and To are the net taxes paid by each young and elderly agent,
respectively; and kGN is deﬁned as the golden rule of the economy in the case






1+n +ξeG −(1 + n)kG > 0, because we are analyzing economies





< 0 is always
negative. Therefore economies whose competitive equilibrium is far from
the golden rule allocation and/or have a golden rule allocation that does not
change much with pollution parameters will tend to have young agents as tax
payers and elderly agents as transfer receivers. However, economies in which
the competitive equilibrium is close to (but above) the golden rule allocation
and/or the golden rule allocation is very sensitive to pollution parameters
will be characterized by young agents as transfer receivers and elderly ones
as tax payers24.
Continuing with the example 2, Table 2 is a prolongation of Table 1 and
shows the optimal capital and wage taxes that places the market equilibrium
in the golden rule allocation. Two points can be made. First, in the absence
of pollution externalities, if the market allocation is dynamically ineﬃcient
the optimal capital-wage tax scheme consists of taxing young agents through
income from work (τw > 0) and transferring the revenue to the old agents.
Second, the existence of a pollution externality increases ineﬃciency and
increases the capital and wage tax rates.
24In fact Proposition 5 shows that a suﬃcient condition for having young agents as tax
payers and elderly agents as transfer receivers is for that the economy to overaccumulate
capital even in the absence of pollution externalities. However, the reverse is not true.
24Table 2: Optimal Taxes on Capital and Wages (Example 2)
β =0 .25
No pollution (αξ =0 ) Pollution externalities (αξ =0 .003)
kC =4 .2224 τk =0 kC =8 .5563 τk =0 .1596
kG =3 .8722 τw =0 .0224 kG =3 .0711 τw =0 .1784
kSG =3 .8722 σ =0 .8525 kSG =3 .4458 σ =8 .3282
β =0 .35
No pollution (αξ =0 ) Pollution externalities (αξ =0 .003)
kC =4 .2285 τk =0 kC =7 .2200 τk = 01596
kG =8 .0024 τw =0 kG =6 .1246 τw =0 .0060
kSG =8 .0024 σ =0 kSG =6 .9946 σ =4 .0796
5.3 Taxes on Production vs. Taxes on Capital and
Wages
Both the tax schemes analyzed succeed in taking the market economy to the
stationary golden rule allocation. This means that from the welfare point
of view, young and elderly agents are indiﬀerent as to which tax scheme
they prefer. However, we can assume that in choosing between diﬀerent tax
schemes agents are likely to prefer those systems in which the amount of
t a x e sp a i di sl o w e r .
Let us consider consumers as the only citizens from the electoral point
of view. The following proposition shows the amount paid by each agent in
both schemes analyzed.
Proposition 6 Young and elderly agents pay more taxes with the capital-
wage system than with the production tax scheme.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
This proposition shows that consumers prefers the production tax system
when the amount paid in tax is the criterion considered. Therefore the
production tax scheme is superior in an electoral context in which each
consumer holds one vote. This result can be considered a kind of “electoral
illusion” because consumer do not take into account the taxes paid by ﬁrms
with the production scheme
256 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the eﬀects that pollution can have on the economy when
it aﬀects the health of agents who are forced to spend on medical care.
The health eﬀect has not often been considered in theoretical environmental
models, although it is well established from the empirical point of view that
quality of environment and health are positively related.
Williams (2002) examines the economic eﬀects of pollution when it aﬀects
consumers’ health in the context of a static general equilibrium model in
which pollution deteriorates the health (reducing the time available for
leisure) or productivity of consumers (forcing expenditure on medical care).
Unlike Williams (2000), our model is a dynamic general equilibrium model
in which pollution is a stock that accumulates over time. This is relevant if
we take into account that in most real environmental problems, pollutants
remain in the environment for long periods (for instance the greenhouse gases
causing global warming, aldicarb aﬀecting groundwater, pollutants causing
acid rain).
We use an overlapping generation framework in which diﬀerent genera-
tions of agents cohabit at any given time. This model feature allows us to
study the relationship between pollution and health in an intergenerational
context. Two main alternative features are introduced with respect to other
studies such as Pautrel (2007). First, we consider that pollution aﬀects the
health of agents , who are forced to spend on medical care when they are
elderly, rather than aﬀecting to the workers’ productivity. Second, we do not
analyze long-run growth eﬀects. We focus rather on optimal taxation and
show how to design tax schemes in order to put the economy into eﬃcient
allocations.
Our characterization of the steady state shows that the more severe the
pollution problem is for the economy the hight the capital and the pollution
ratios are. These results diﬀer in some terms from those obtained by John
et al. (1995), who ﬁnd that economies in which consumption causes greater
environmental degradation accumulate less capital. This is so because in
John et al.’s model agents pay taxes to maintain environmental quality when
they are young and therefore an increase in degradation reduces their savings
for the future. By contrast, greater environmental degradation increases
health costs in our model, which are paid in old age, and thus agents have
to increase savings and capital.
We show that the introduction of pollution externalities into the standard
OGM yields two new results with regard to the eﬃciency. On the one hand,
there are capital ratios above the golden rule capital ratio which may be
eﬃcient in the Pareto sense. Due to the existence of health costs associated
26with pollution, it may appear a bell shape relationship may appear between
the planner’s discount rate and thecapital ratio. The planner’s discount rate
aﬀects the steady state capital stock through a new channel, i.e. a lower
planner’s discount rate implies lower pollution levels transferred to future
periods, but since pollution is linked to the capital stock, it also implies
lower capital stock levels transferred. This eﬀect is opposite to the classic
o n ea c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hal o w e rp l a n n e r ’ sd i s c o u n tr a t ei m p l i e sh i g h e rw e i g h t s
for future generations and thereby higher savings that transfer more capital
to the future. The relative strengths of the two channels determines whether
a decrease in the planner’s discount rate implies higher or lower capital stock.
On the other hand, we show that the presence of pollution makes it more
probable that competitive equilibrium will be dynamically ineﬃcient. In
particular, we show that if the economy accumulates more capital than the
level deﬁned above by the super golden rule ratio, there are other allocations
where no generation is worse oﬀ and some are better oﬀ. For those cases,
we analyze two types of tax scheme. One is based on taxing production and
the other on taxing capital and wages. We show that if the two schemes are
designed to place the economy in the golden rule allocation, then young and
elderly agents pay less taxes (or receive more transfers) under the production
scheme than under the capital-wage tax system. This implies that the
production tax scheme is superior in an electoral context in which each
consumer holds one vote.
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31Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
To prove the ﬁrst part of the proposition, about stability, we linearize the
dynamic system (7)-(8) around the steady state. The linear approximation




































,i sas i n ki ft h e
following inequalities hold:
i) | Φ |< 1,
ii) | Φ | +T +1> 0,
iii) | Φ | −T +1> 0,
where T is the trace of Φ.
The strategy of the proof is to show that the stability condition imposed
in Proposition 1 implies i), ii) and iii).












holds. Since sw and se are positive and 0 <δ<1, this condition implies































































P r o o fo fi i i ) :It is easy to show that






















which is positive under the stability condition imposed.


























































Notice that |Γ| is positive under the stability condition imposed. It is









∂λ = − sr















|Γ| < 0, ∂k





















∂i for i = α,n,δ. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
The eﬃcient capital ratio is deﬁned as
∙
1 −
αξ (1 + n)(1+R)















[(1 + n)(1+R) − (1 − λ)][(1 + n)(1+R) − (1 − δ)]
























(1 − δ) − χ1/2





(1 + n)(1− αξ)
,
where χ =( 1− δ)αξ [(1 − δ) − (1 − λ)(1− αξ)] > 0 provided the feasibility









3 (1 − αξ)








and given that the economy feasibility condition guarantees that αξ < n+δ
1+n <








< 0 ∀ R<R − <R +,
> 0 ∀ R− <R<R +,
< 0 ∀ R− <R + <R .
This means that R+ is the planner´s discount rate which leads to the





2χ−1/2 (1 − αξ)(1− δ)[(1− δ) − (1 − λ)(1− 2αξ)] + (1 − δ)+χ1/2
(1 + n)(1− αξ)
2 ,
which is positive provided under the feasibility condition. Therefore, R+ is
a continuous and increasing function of αξ with the following ﬁxed point,
∂R+
∂αξ





2 − (1 − δ)(1− λ)
< 1.
34This means that ∀ αξ ∈ (αξ
∗,1), the maximum eﬃcient capital ratio is
achieved for R+ > 0. And ∀ αξ
0 ∈ (0,αξ
∗), the maximum eﬃcient capital
ratio is achieved for R+ < 0; since the central planner’s discount factor is
only deﬁn e di nt h er a n k[0,∞), for all values of αξ ∈ (0,αξ
∗),t h em a x i m u m
eﬃcient capital ratio is reached for R =0 . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Assume that the economy is initially on a stationary equilibrium path ¡
k,e,c1,c2
¢
. Consider the following disturbance. At time τ,the capital ratio
is reduced by a small amount ε and consumption by old and young agents
is increased by the same amount. Finally, let the capital from τ on be given
by k = k − ε. The utility of all generations born up to τ − 1 is unchanged.
The generation born at τ − 1 is better oﬀ because the new allocation has
increased its consumption in old age.
Generations born at τ and later are better oﬀ because their (current
or/and future) consumption increases. This is easy to see, since from τ on
the capital ratio remains constant, the stock of pollution in any future period




















































Therefore, any change in k will aﬀect cτ+i = c1,τ+i +
c2,τ+i

















− (n + λ).












¢i+1i, ∀i ≥ 0.
35Given that the right hand side is an increasing function with i, this condition










Since f00 < 0, this expression means that whenever the stock of capital
exceeds the super golden rule capital ratio, a reallocation of capital such
as the one proposed increases the utility of the generations born at τ and
later. Therefore this new allocation is a Pareto improvement over the initial
allocation. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
The optimal scheme follows directly on comparing equations (18)-(24)
with equations (14)-(15) for the case in which R =0and considering the

























Since we are considering economies with capital overaccumulation, in the
golden rule allocation it must be true that savings of young agents cannot
cover the consumption and health expenses of elderly agents. Therefore τo
must be a transfer (negative). However τy only is negative if the pollution is
the only cause of overaccumulation, i.e. if
cG
2




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
The optimal scheme follows directly on comparing equations (25)-(31)
with equations (14)-(17) for the case in which R =0and considering the
government budget constraint. In particular, comparing equations (25) and




(1 − τk)=( 1 + n). Taking this into account,










If this expression is compared with the eﬃcient condition given by equation
(13) valued at R =0 , the following expression must hold
∙
1 −

















(1 − τk) − (1 − λ).






(n+δ)−αξ(1+n), and after some manipulation the above expression implies that




τw is obtained directly by substituting equation (28) and (30) into (26).
σ is obtained straightforwardly by taking into account in equation (27) that ¡
1+rC¢
(1 − τk)=( 1+n) is satisﬁed when we compare equations (25) and
(12) valued at R =0 .
On the other hand, since we are considering economies with capital
overaccumulation, in the golden rule allocation it must be true that savings
of young agents cannot cover the consumption and health expenses of elderly
agents. Therefore σ must be positive
On the other hand, since n+δ>(1 + n)αξ ( s e ef o o t n o t e1 7 ) ,0 <τ k < 1.
In regard to the tax rate on wages, τw, it can immediately be seen that it
must be less than one, since concavity of the production function guarantees







1+n − (1 + n)kG
f(kG) − f0(kG)kG,
which is positive if
cG
2
1+n > (1 + n)kG. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :



































with the production and capital-wage schemes, respectively. Since the










































with the production and capital-wage schemes, respectively. TP
o <T C−W
o
because f0 ¡
kGN¢
<f 0 ¡
kG¢
. ¥
37